Formally verified firewall

The proven firewall

Mithril enforces your network policy in FPGA logic that is mathematically verified against its specification. Only the traffic you allow gets through, and there is no software in the path to exploit.

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From small enterprise to telecom backbone

Why now

Firewalls have become the way in

Attackers now go through the devices meant to keep them out. Mithril has no software in its traffic path to exploit, and its forwarding logic is proven against its specification.

22%

of vulnerability exploitation in Verizon's 2025 breach report targeted edge devices and VPNs, up from 3% the year before.

Infosecurity Magazine on the Verizon DBIR ↗

~30%

of the incidents Sophos investigated over a year began at a firewall, router or VPN.

ITPro on the Sophos Annual Threat Report ↗

48,800

Cisco firewalls were still exposed to actively exploited flaws on 29 September 2025.

BleepingComputer ↗

Proof

Verified where the packets are

Every link from the specification to the bitstream on the chip is proved. Anything that is not a theorem is written down as a named assumption.

Specification
Protocol and security proofs
Hardware design (RTL)
Mapped netlist
Bitstream on the ECP5

Each arrow is a machine-checked proof.

Egress

Nothing leaves without your grant

Every unit of data leaving your network needs a live grant from you, and every path to the internet goes through one gate, with no way around it.

Policy

Only you change policy

Only your key installs policy, versions never roll back, and what you approve on your handheld is exactly what gets installed.

Receiving

Forged packets change nothing

A packet that fails authentication produces nothing inside your network and changes no session, key or replay state.

Holds against untrusted machines inside your network and any attacker on the internet side. Only your key and handheld are trusted.

Read the full proof statement

Range

From small enterprise to telecom backbone

Mithril will come in a range of sizes, from a compact unit for a small business to systems for large-scale telecom network backbones. Every size runs the same verified policy engine, so the guarantees stay the same as you scale.

Small enterprise

Offices and branches

A compact unit for a small business, a branch office or a remote site.

Large enterprise

Campus and data centre

Policy between sites, zones, racks and tenants, for organisations with many locations.

Service providers

Telecom backbone

Enforcement sized for carrier and backbone networks, with the same proof behind every decision.

Detailed specifications will follow. Tell us what you need to protect and we will match you to the right size.

Talk to us about your network

Remote access

VPN for every site and every user

Mithril ends VPN tunnels itself, from links between sites to remote access for whole teams. Staff and contractors connect straight to it and reach only what your allowlist permits.

Site to site

Link every site

Connect offices, branches and data centres over encrypted tunnels that end on Mithril, without a separate VPN appliance.

Teams

Many users at once

Give every engineer and contractor their own sign-in, with many people connected at the same time. Larger units support more people at once.

Policy

One allowlist, inside and out

Traffic leaving a tunnel is checked against the same allowlist as everything else, so a remote user reaches only the hosts and ports you named.

Protocol: WireGuard, interoperable with unmodified Linux WireGuard.

Use cases

Where it fits

The same verified policy engine works at every layer of your network, from a single branch office to the data centre backbone.

Network edge

Put a proven policy between your network and the internet, at headquarters and at every branch. Only the traffic you allow gets in or out.

Internal segmentation

Split your network into zones for users, servers and production systems, so an attacker who gets into one cannot reach the rest.

Data centre and telecom backbone

Enforce policy between racks, tenants and carrier networks, with every check running in hardware.

Remote workforce

Give staff, partners and contractors VPN access that reaches only what each of them needs, with many people connected at once.

Critical infrastructure

Protect industrial and operational networks where one wrong command can stop a plant, with checks on industrial protocols built in.

Industries

Built for the networks that cannot stop

How Mithril fits the networks of the sectors we work with, and what has gone wrong there.

Supermarkets and groceryKeep freezers, tills and contractor access on separate allowlists in every store. Energy and utilitiesLet vendors read your substations and plants, never write to them. Telecom operatorsLine-rate enforcement for the backbone, with logic that is proven rather than patched. ManufacturingKeep the lines running when IT goes down, with one controlled way in for suppliers. Public sector and defenceRemote access that is not the breach, with a proof your assessors can review. Data centres and cloudSeal the management plane and give tenants an assured boundary. Financial servicesKeep payment and SWIFT zones on proven allowlists, and give staff remote access that is not the next breach. HealthcareSegment the devices you cannot patch and the suppliers you cannot do without. Transport and logisticsKeep cranes, signalling and conveyors running when office systems go down.

Comparison

Next to a typical NGFW

Mithril is built to sit beside a next-generation firewall, not to replace it. Here is how the two divide the work.

Mithril compared with a typical next-generation firewall
Aspect	Mithril	Typical NGFW
Where decisions are made	Verified FPGA logic	Software on a CPU, often with ASIC offload
Assurance	Machine-checked proof of the properties above	Testing and third-party certification
Policy model	Allowlist only	Allow and deny rules, plus signature-based IPS
TLS inspection	Does not intercept encrypted traffic, by design. Can originate outbound TLS itself (optional).	Intercepts and re-encrypts traffic, usually under a subscription.
Rated throughput	One figure, with every check on	Datasheets give a lower figure with inspection on

Reserve

How reserving works

The first production run is limited to 1,000 units. The first 100 can be reserved now with no payment: up to 10 units online, or more by talking to our team.

Reserve

Reserve up to 10 units online with no payment, while the first 100 last. For more than 10, call our team.

Choose your size

After the beta we publish the full range, specifications and prices. Confirm the size that fits, or cancel at no cost.

Ship

You pay only once you confirm your order.

Reserve your unit

Put a proof in front of your network

Only 1,000 units will be made in the first production run, and the first 100 can be reserved with no payment.

Need more than 10 units? Call our team · Apply for the beta

We use your email only to handle your reservation. Privacy notice

Industries / Supermarkets and grocery

Protect your freezers from the internet

In October 2026 attackers reached refrigeration systems in about 700 French supermarkets, reportedly forcing them into defrost¹². On 2 November a second wave hit stores in Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Estonia, the Netherlands and Luxembourg³⁴. Mithril puts every controller, till and shelf label behind a default-deny allowlist, and gives each contractor a VPN that reaches only their own equipment.

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One store, many networks

Every system in its own zone

A store runs tills, refrigeration, shelf labels, building systems and guest Wi-Fi side by side. Mithril gives each its own zone, and each zone can reach only what you list.

Outside

Head office, payment provider, cloud services, and contractors over VPN

Default deny

Tills and paymentsthe payment provider and the head office systems you name
Refrigeration and HVACtemperature reads from head office; setpoint and defrost changes only from named engineers
Shelf labels and scalesthe pricing server, on the ports it uses
Building and camerasthe building management system and recorder you name
Guest Wi-Fithe internet only, never the store network

What has happened

Grocers are now a target

In four weeks, attackers have twice reached supermarket refrigeration across Europe. Attacks on grocers have moved from stealing data to stopping stores from trading.

2 Nov 2026

Now: a second wave across Europe

Overnight, attackers manipulated refrigeration controls in more than 50 stores in Belgium, more than a dozen in Ireland, Estonia, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and a limited number of stores in Sweden. Ahold Delhaize, Colruyt, ICA and Coop reported affected stores, and a Stockholm store manager said all its freezers reached 50°C. No one has yet been identified as responsible, and investigations are ongoing³⁴.

Oct 2026

Refrigeration sabotage in about 700 French stores

Attackers reportedly found internet-facing refrigeration controllers in Intermarché, Carrefour, Auchan, Coopérative U and other stores, and set them to defrost until temperatures reached 50°C. Coopérative U's chief executive said losses at a large store could reach €180,000 to €200,000. The controller maker advised customers to operate its systems behind a firewall¹².

Oct 2026

Ahold Delhaize takes systems offline

Albert Heijn's fresh shelves emptied and its online sales stopped for almost two weeks. Retail analysts put the lost sales at €120 to €150 million⁵.

What Mithril does here

Freezers that only take orders from you

Mithril checks the industrial command in every request, so head office can read temperatures while setpoint and defrost changes come only from the engineers you name.

Contractors without open doors

Replace web panels and mobile modems facing the internet with a VPN account for each contractor, which reaches only their own equipment.

Evidence for your PCI audit

An allowlist per zone matches PCI DSS requirements 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, which restrict traffic into and out of the card environment to what is necessary⁶.

Start with one region's refrigeration, next to the SD-WAN you already run

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Sources

Industries / Energy and utilities

Let vendors read, never write

In December 2025 attackers came in through internet-facing VPN firewalls and wiped control equipment at 30 or more Polish wind and solar farms¹². Mithril enforces each conduit in verified logic and checks industrial commands, so a remote session can read values without changing them.

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One site, many conduits

Zones and conduits, enforced in hardware

IEC 62443 asks you to split a site into zones and control the conduits between them³. Mithril is the conduit: each zone reaches only what you list.

Outside

Control centre, corporate IT, and vendors over VPN

Default deny

Substation and protection relayspolling from the control centre; no writes from remote sessions
SCADA and HMIthe control centre and the engineers you name
Remote terminal unitsreads from SCADA only
Vendor accessa VPN account per vendor, to their own equipment only
Corporate IToperational data out, nothing in

What has happened

The way in is usually the edge

Recent attacks on European energy and water came through VPNs, exposed control panels and default passwords.

Dec 2025

Wind and solar farms in Poland

Attackers entered through internet-facing FortiGate firewalls used as VPN concentrators, without multi-factor login, then wiped or corrupted RTUs, protection relays and HMIs at 30 or more sites. Analysts say the activity matches a Russia-linked group¹².

Apr 2025

A dam's flood gate in Norway

Attackers took control of a dam's flood gate and opened it for about four hours. Norwegian authorities later said pro-Russian hackers were likely behind it⁴.

2025

Water treatment plants in Poland

Five plants were breached through default passwords and control systems exposed to the internet. At one, an intruder changed pump and filter thresholds⁵.

What Mithril does here

Read, never write

Mithril checks the industrial command in every request, so monitoring can read values while writes come only from the stations you name.

A proven gate for vendors

Each vendor gets a VPN account that reaches only their own equipment, and the gate itself runs no software to exploit.

Conduits an auditor can read

Every allowed flow is a written rule, which maps directly to IEC 62443 zones and conduits and to NIS and NERC CIP evidence.

Start with the remote access into one site

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Sources

Industries / Telecom operators

Your edge should not be the way in

According to the FBI, Salt Typhoon targeted more than 600 organisations in 80 countries, getting in through flaws in widely used VPN, firewall and router software¹. Mithril's forwarding logic is proven against its specification and runs at line rate, with no software in the traffic path.

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One network, many planes

Keep the planes apart

Separate management, signalling and customer traffic, and allow only the flows each plane needs.

Outside

Peering and transit, customer edge, and NOC engineers over VPN

Default deny

Management planethe NOC and the engineers you name, over VPN
Signallingthe peers and nodes you list
Core routingrouting sessions with named neighbours
Virtualisation and orchestrationthe orchestration hosts you name
OSS and BSSthe systems that feed them, nothing else

What has happened

Network vendors' own code is the target

The largest campaigns against operators went through the edge devices meant to protect them.

Aug 2025

Salt Typhoon advisory

Thirteen countries warned that a China-linked group was getting in through flaws in Ivanti, Palo Alto and Cisco edge software. The FBI said it had targeted more than 600 organisations in 80 countries¹.

Sep 2025

Cisco firewalls

Zero-days in Cisco ASA and FTD firewalls led to an emergency directive. On 29 September more than 48,800 were still exposed and vulnerable²³.

Apr 2025

Fortinet devices

More than 14,000 Fortinet devices were found with a backdoor that survived patching⁴.

What Mithril does here

Proven, not patched

The parser is proven to reach a defined state for any input, so malformed packets cannot push it somewhere unexpected.

Line rate, every check on

Every check runs in hardware at the unit's full rated throughput, up to backbone scale.

Evidence for regulators

Per-plane allowlists are written evidence of the separation that telecom security rules ask for.

Start with the management plane

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Sources

Industries / Manufacturing

Keep the line running when IT goes down

A cyberattack stopped Jaguar Land Rover's production for about five weeks in 2025, with knock-on costs estimated at £1.9 billion¹². Mithril separates each line from corporate IT with a proven allowlist and gives every supplier one controlled way in.

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One plant, many cells

A zone for every line

Split the plant into cells and lines, keep corporate IT on the other side, and allow only the flows production needs.

Outside

Corporate IT, MES and ERP, and suppliers over VPN

Default deny

Line and cell controllersthe MES and the engineering stations you name
Robots and machine toolstheir own cell only
Engineering workstationsprogram changes to named controllers, from named people
Supplier accessa VPN account per supplier, to their own machines only
Corporate ITproduction data out, nothing in

What has happened

Manufacturing is the most attacked industrial sector

When the office network goes down, plants without a hard boundary stop with it.

Aug 2025

Jaguar Land Rover

JLR disclosed the attack on 2 September and restarted production in phases from 8 October. JLR reported £196 million of exceptional costs for the quarter, and the Cyber Monitoring Centre estimated the total cost at about £1.9 billion across more than 5,000 organisations¹².

Jul 2026

Fairlife

Coca-Cola's dairy business temporarily suspended US production after a cyberattack reported as ransomware³.

Q2 2026

1,140 attacks in one quarter

Dragos counted 1,140 ransomware attacks on industrial organisations, 65% of them in manufacturing, and found internet-facing edge devices and remote management tools were the main technical way in⁴.

What Mithril does here

Lines that keep running

When corporate IT is hit, the plant side accepts only the flows you allowed, so a compromised office network cannot reach the controllers.

One way in for suppliers

55% of the industrial environments Claroty studied run four or more remote-access tools⁵. Replace them with one VPN where each supplier reaches only their own machines.

Zones per line

Each allowlist is a written conduit, ready for IEC 62443 and NIS2 audits.

Start with one line, or with supplier access

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Sources

Industries / Public sector and defence

Assurance you can show an assessor

Remote-access servers and appliances were the way into the British Library and the Dutch Public Prosecution Service¹². Mithril pairs remote access that reaches only what each user needs with a machine-checked proof your assessors can review.

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One organisation, many zones

Keep separate what must stay separate

Legacy systems, public services and partner connections each get their own zone.

Outside

Public services, partner organisations, and staff and suppliers over VPN

Default deny

Legacy systemsthe services that still depend on them, nothing else
Public-facing servicesthe back-end systems they call
Partner connectionsthe organisations and ranges you agree
Administrationnamed administrators over VPN
Supplier accessa VPN account per supplier, to their own systems

What has happened

Remote access is the common thread

Recent public-sector breaches started at remote-access and management appliances.

Oct 2023

British Library

Attackers most likely got in through a remote-access server used by suppliers, which had no multi-factor login, and took about 600GB of data¹.

Jul 2025

Dutch Public Prosecution Service

Breached through a zero-day in Citrix NetScaler appliances that had been exploited since at least early May².

Early 2026

Dutch government bodies

Zero-days in Ivanti's mobile device management were used against the Dutch data protection authority and the Council for the Judiciary. The European Commission reported a similar attack³.

What Mithril does here

Proof as assurance evidence

The machine-checked proof and its stated assumptions give assessors evidence beyond testing alone.

Remote access that is not the breach

Each user and supplier reaches only the systems you name, through a gate with no software in its traffic path.

Legacy systems kept apart

Systems that cannot be replaced stay in service in their own zone, reachable only by the services that depend on them.

Talk to us about assurance and procurement

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Sources

Industries / Data centres and cloud

Seal the management plane

In January 2024 ransomware encrypted the virtualisation and management servers in one of Tietoevry's Swedish data centres, taking customers' services offline¹. Mithril keeps management, out-of-band and tenant networks apart, with default deny proven in hardware.

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One facility, many networks

Management apart from everything else

Hypervisor management, out-of-band access and building systems are the keys to every tenant. Give each its own zone.

Outside

Tenants, carriers and interconnect, and operators over VPN

Default deny

Hypervisor and storage managementthe operations team, over VPN
Out-of-band accessnamed engineers only
Building and power systemsthe facilities management system
Tenant interconnecteach tenant's own address ranges
Backupthe backup servers you name, nothing in from tenants

What has happened

One management network, every customer

When the management plane falls, every tenant behind it goes with it.

Jan 2024

Tietoevry

Ransomware encrypted the virtualisation and management servers in one Swedish data centre, disrupting services for Swedish companies and public bodies¹.

Jun 2025

Data centre providers

US agencies assessed that the Chinese group behind the telecom intrusions likely also reached data centre and residential internet providers².

What Mithril does here

A sealed management plane

Only the operators you name, over VPN, can reach hypervisor, storage and out-of-band management.

An assured boundary per tenant

Offer each tenant an enforcement point whose forwarding logic is proven, not just configured.

Sized for interconnect

Every check runs in hardware at full rated throughput, at the data centre edge and between facilities.

Start with the management network

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Sources

Industries / Financial services

Remote access that is not the next breach

Armis says firewalls, VPNs and other edge hardware featured in 40% of breach investigations in 2024 and 2025¹. Mithril gives staff and suppliers VPN access that reaches only what each needs, and keeps payment zones on proven allowlists.

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One institution, many zones

The zones that move money

Separate the systems that move money from everything else, and let each reach only the systems it settles with. Mithril sits beside your existing inspection, not in place of it.

Outside

Corporate network, market and payment networks, and staff and suppliers over VPN

Default deny

SWIFT and payment gatewaysthe counterparties and back-office systems you name
Card environmentthe processors and systems PCI DSS allows
Trading systemsthe venues and market data feeds you list
Back officethe payment zone, on the flows you name
Supplier accessa VPN account per supplier, to their own systems

What has happened

Through the firewall, and through suppliers

Recent incidents in finance came in through edge devices and third parties.

Aug 2025

Marquis

Attackers breached a technology supplier to more than 70 US banks and credit unions. Marquis says they used firewall configuration data taken from SonicWall's cloud backups. 672,075 people were affected².

Nov 2023

ICBC Financial Services

Ransomware at the US broker-dealer arm of the world's largest bank disrupted the settlement of US Treasury trades³.

What Mithril does here

Remote access that reaches one thing

Each employee and supplier gets a VPN account tied to the systems they need, and nothing else is reachable.

Payment zones on proven allowlists

SWIFT, card and trading zones accept only the flows you write down, enforced in verified logic.

Evidence for DORA

Every allowed flow is a written rule, which feeds directly into your ICT risk documentation⁴.

Start with remote access or one payment zone

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Sources

Industries / Healthcare

Protect the devices you cannot patch

When attackers got into Change Healthcare through a remote-access portal without multi-factor login, UnitedHealth booked $872 million of costs in a single quarter¹. Mithril puts medical devices, labs and suppliers in their own zones, each reaching only what care needs.

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One hospital, many zones

Clinical systems in their own zones

Scanners, analysers and infusion pumps often run software that cannot be updated. Give each group its own zone and let it reach only the systems it works with.

Outside

Hospital network, national health services, and suppliers over VPN

Default deny

Imagingthe image archive and reporting systems you name
Lab analysersthe lab system, and the supplier's own support connection
Bedside and infusion devicestheir management server only
Estates and building systemsthe building management system
Supplier accessa VPN account per supplier, to their own equipment

What has happened

Suppliers and remote access are the weak points

The largest health incidents of recent years started outside the hospital.

Jun 2024

Synnovis

Ransomware at a pathology supplier postponed 10,152 outpatient appointments and 1,710 elective procedures across south east London. Synnovis estimated the cost at £32.7 million²³.

Feb 2024

Change Healthcare

Attackers entered through a remote-access portal without multi-factor login. UnitedHealth booked $872 million of costs in the first quarter¹.

Mar 2025

Exposed medical devices

Claroty found that 89% of 351 healthcare organisations had connected medical devices with known exploited vulnerabilities and insecure internet connections⁴.

What Mithril does here

Zones for what cannot be patched

Old operating systems stay in service. Mithril limits each device to the systems it works with, so one compromised machine cannot reach the rest.

Suppliers inside the boundary

Labs, imaging and estates suppliers each get a VPN account that reaches only their own equipment.

Beside the boundary you have

Mithril works inside the organisation, next to your existing perimeter service, not in place of it.

Start with one department's devices

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Sources

Industries / Transport and logistics

Keep cargo moving when IT stops

In March 2026 ransomware took the digital systems of Spain's Port of Vigo offline¹. Mithril keeps cranes, signalling and conveyors in their own zones, so an attack on office systems does not stop operations.

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One terminal, many systems

Operations in their own zones

Terminal equipment, signalling and warehouse systems each get a zone, reachable only from the systems that run them.

Outside

Operations centre, corporate IT, and partners over VPN

Default deny

Cranes and terminal equipmentthe terminal operating system you name
Signalling and controlthe control centre only
Conveyors and sortersthe warehouse management system
Partner accessa VPN account per partner, to their own systems only
Corporate IToperational data out, nothing in

What has happened

One supplier or one system can stop a hub

Recent incidents show how quickly a single compromise spreads to operations.

Mar 2026

Port of Vigo

Ransomware took the port's digital systems offline¹.

Sep 2025

Heathrow, Brussels and Berlin

Ransomware at a supplier of shared check-in software disrupted check-in at Heathrow, Brussels and Berlin².

What Mithril does here

Operations that keep running

When office systems are hit, operational zones accept only the flows you allowed, so cranes, signalling and conveyors keep working.

One way in for partners

Each partner and supplier gets a VPN account that reaches only their own systems.

Segmentation you can evidence

Every allowed flow is a written rule, the separation that aviation, rail and NIS regulators ask for.

Start with one terminal or depot

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Sources

Proof / Full statement

Proven from specification to bitstream

The bitstream configured on the chip implements a model, and in that model the claims below hold against the attackers below, under named assumptions. Every link in the chain is proved. Anything that is not a theorem is written down as an assumption.

Specification
Protocol and security proofs
Hardware design (RTL)
Mapped netlist
Bitstream on the ECP5

Each arrow is a machine-checked proof.

Who it holds against

Inside

Untrusted machines

Anything on your network you do not fully trust, such as a fleet of AI agents. They can run any code, choose any bytes and timing, and work with the outside.

Outside

The network

An attacker on the internet side who can read, drop, delay, replay, reorder and forge any frame. The proofs name two observers: one who sees every frame's bytes, lengths, addresses and arrival times, and one who sees everything except the payload.

Trusted

You, and only you

Your owner key and your handheld. Nothing else is trusted.

What is proven

Sending

Runs that differ only in secret keys and in messages of the same length make the same sending decisions and emit identical headers, counters, lengths and timing. The payload is the encrypted message. This is a guarantee about metadata, not a proof that the encryption is unbreakable.

Receiving

Secret keys and message contents do not change which packets are accepted or dropped. Anything delivered inside comes only from successful decryption, and a packet that fails authentication produces nothing inside and changes no replay, session or key state.

No replays

Each packet in a session is delivered at most once. The window accepts unseen packets up to 8,128 back and refuses duplicates, packets that are too old and counters past the limit.

WireGuard

Handshake, sessions, rekeying, cookies and timers follow a WireGuard reference model, and the box works with unmodified Linux WireGuard.

Nothing leaves without your grant

Every unit of data leaving from the inside needs a live grant from you covering its destination, protocol, enforcement profile and quota, and quota is used up atomically. Everything that writes to the internet side, including the VPN, proxy, traffic shaper, admin replies and diagnostics, goes through one exit gate with no way around it. Revoking a grant takes effect the moment it is committed, and expiry allows for a declared clock-error bound.

Only you change policy

Only your enrolled key can install policy. Policy versions only go up, per device and domain, so there are no forks and no rollback, even if storage is restored. Erasing the device removes its keys.

What you approve is what installs

What you approve on your handheld's trusted screen is exactly what gets installed. Messages from machines on the inside cannot reach or forge that approval.

A trustworthy platform

Keys come from an entropy source that passes a declared health test. The clock never runs backwards within a boot. After a reset, grants stay closed until time is re-established. Only signed images at or above the version floor boot.

Optional protections

Each holds only when switched on: constant-rate mode, which sends fixed-size encrypted cells at fixed times whatever the inside is doing; allowlist-only mode, on by default; re-randomising listed protocol fields; and starting the internet-side TLS session at the box itself.

C12

The chip is the model

The bitstream on the device implements the model in which all of the above hold.

Named assumptions

Every link that is not a theorem is listed as an assumption, so your security team can see exactly where the proof stops.

Ask us for the proof report

i.Encryption is modelled symbolically. The proofs cover what is sent, when and how, not the strength of the cipher.
ii.Your owner key and your handheld are trusted.
iii.Grant expiry relies on a declared bound on clock error.